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Abstract Since its inception in 2006, the United Nations-
backed Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) have
grown to over 1300 signatories representing over $45
trillion. This growth is not slowing down. In this paper, we
argue that there is a set of attributes which make the PRI
salient as a stakeholder and its claim to sign the six PRI
important to institutional investors. We use Mitchell et al.’s
(Acad Manag Rev 22:853–886, 1997) theoretical frame-
work of stakeholder salience, as extended by Gifford (J Bus
Eth 92:79–97, 2010). We use as evidence confidential data
from the annual survey of signatories carried out by the
PRI in a 5-year period between 2007 and 2011. The find-
ings highlight pragmatic and organizational legitimacy,
normative and utilitarian power, and management values as
the attributes that contribute most to the salience of the PRI
as a stakeholder.
Keywords Stakeholder salience theory  Principles for
responsible investment  PRI  UNPRI  Responsible
investment  Socially responsible investment  Stakeholder
theory
JEL Classifications A01  G00  G1  G02
Introduction
As recurring financial crises and financial market instabil-
ity are prompting a reconsideration of how we invest
(Woods and Urwin 2010), there is increased interest from
academics and practitioners in responsible investment
strategies. Socially responsible investment (SRI) includes
environmental, social and governance (ESG) factors in
investment decision making. If responsible investment is
part of the answer to the troubles of the financial system, it
is important to know what causes investors to take this
strategy on board. Institutional investors as a group of
financial actors with distinct motivations (Jansson and Biel
2011) and barriers (Guyatt 2006) to adopting ESG are
worthy of scrutiny. They control the majority of total
shareholdings -84 % in the UK (Mallin 2007)—and in
most countries account for the overwhelming majority of
SRI assets (Jansson and Biel 2011). A wide adoption of
ESG by institutional investors would mean real momentum
behind the ESG movement (Sandberg 2011).
The United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible
Investment (PRI) is a global organization that advances
responsible investment with over 1300 signatories repre-
senting over $45 trillion (as of Dec. 2014). Because of its
size, prominence, and first-mover status, the PRI is likely the
most important global responsible investment initiative in
existence today (Sandberg 2013; Woods and Urwin 2010).
The combined impact of the PRI’s activity has firmly put
responsible investment on the map (Sievanen et al. 2013). As
Sophia Grene wrote in the Financial Times in 2009: ‘‘That
sustainability is no longer a niche concept, sitting in the
corner with the church groups and green evangelists, can be
demonstrated by figures from the UN PRI.’’
Why have over 1300 institutional investors decided over
the last 9 years to sign the PRI? Why dedicate resources
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that would otherwise be used to satisfy other stakeholders’
claims, to the annual reporting, signatory fees and imple-
menting the six PRI principles? To analyze this question,
we use the framework of institutional theory which
unpacks the way institutions respond to external pressures
beyond their internal mandate (DiMaggio and Powell
1983; Dorado 2005; Greenwood and Hinings 1996;
Greenwood et al. 2011; Lounsbury 2007). We will explore
the stakeholder relationship between the PRI and investors
to find out what makes the PRI’s claim salient to these
investors. For that purpose, we use a set of attributes first
identified by Mitchell et al. (1997) and then expanded by
Gifford (2010) as to what makes stakeholders and their
claims salient to organizations.
While there has been much speculation, there are cur-
rently no other empirical studies as to why investors have
chosen to sign these principles. It is the motivation of this
paper to shed some light on that question, using an
important confidential dataset obtained directly from the
PRI drawn from annual surveys over a 5-year period
(2007–2011) of their signatories. This confidential dataset
has been provided to us exclusively for the purpose of this
study Fig. 1.
To tackle the question why institutional investors sign
the PRI, we have to think of the investment firm as an
organization that has stakeholders with competing claims.
This is a new way to look at investors, as the academic
literature to date, usually describes them as stakeholder’s of
the firm (Brower and Mahajan 2013; Verbeke and Tung
2013). The PRI with its objective of pushing SRI into the
mainstream via its signatory body is affected by the insti-
tutional investor’s adoption or rejection of the principles,
making the PRI a stakeholder to investors according to
Freeman’s (1984) definition of stakeholder. Observing the
principles and the commitment to them is the claim that the
PRI makes of all institutional investors. Therefore, signing
the PRI for the purpose of this paper counts as prioritizing a
stakeholder’s claim based on its salience. Competing
stakeholder claims would be e.g., the clients’ or benefi-
ciaries’ lack of expressed interest in RI, competing
reporting frameworks that would claim the resources
otherwise dedicated to the PRI annual reporting and
implementation of the principles, or the investment team’s
entrenchment in their existing mainstream investment
approach.
We code 5 years of signatories’ responses to the ques-
tion of why they signed the principles and what they per-
ceive to be the benefits of signing, in search of evidence of
the attributes of power, legitimacy, urgency, management
values, coalition building, and relative economic size
(Gifford 2010; Mitchell et al. 1997) contributing to the
salience of the PRI’s claim in the eyes of investors.
The paper will first introduce the conceptual back-
ground, exploring existing literature on institutional theory
and stakeholder relationships in the context of responsible
investment. Next, the theoretical framework and its appli-
cation will be detailed. In the following parts, we describe
the dataset and methodology. The final parts of the paper
present and discuss the findings. The paper closes with
research limitations and conclusions.
Conceptual Background
The PRI is a global investor association founded in 2005
with the backing of the United Nations and the objective of
promoting the six PRI and helping institutional investors
who sign to implement them. Institutional investors are
defined as organizations that manage and invest on behalf
of clients and beneficiaries. This includes pension funds,
banks, asset managers, and insurers among other types of
organizations (Sandberg 2011). Devised by the investment
community itself, the principles form a framework for
incorporating ESG issues into investment decision making.
They are based on the conviction that ESG factors have an
impact on the performance of investments (Table 1).
The PRI’s voluntary and aspirational nature means that
there is a large heterogeneity of ESG advancement among
its one thousand-odd signatories. Therefore, being a sig-
natory to the principles is not necessarily synonymous with
being a responsible investor. However, the mere act of
signing the principles remains worthy of scrutiny, as, in the
words of PRI founder James Gifford: ‘‘The important thing
is to get people in the tent, for whatever reason. Then once
they are in, you can start to inspire change.’’ (Gifford 2014,
pers. comm., 15 June) This mechanism of gradual decrease
with time in the gap between declared policy and practice
is documented in academic literature on decoupling
(Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008; Bromley and Powell 2012;
Edelman 1992; Hallett 2010; Sauder and Espeland 2009;
Scott 2008; Tilcsik 2010), most relevantly in Haack et al.’s
(2012) study on the adoption of the Equator Principles that
Fig. 1 Growth of the collective AUM of PRI signatories. Source
http://www.unpri.org. Accessed 23 June 2014
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finds decoupling to be a transitory phenomenon. The PRI is
not an isolated phenomenon in the contemporary institu-
tional landscape. In the area of responsible investment
regional, Social Investment Forums (SIFs) and the United
Nations Environmental Program Finance Initiative (UNEP
FI) are also important organizations.
Institutional theory has made many valid attempts to
systematize the way we look at industry initiatives of
similar nature (Dumas and Louche 2011; Gond et al. 2011).
Especially the literature on private regulation and multi-
stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) has contributed significantly
to this effort (Bartley 2007; Hardenbrook 2007; Mena and
Palazzo 2012). It is worth highlighting that the PRI differs
from the organizations studied by the MSI literature in that
it does not have regulatory characteristics per se as the six
Principles in and of themselves are not overly prescriptive.
However, despite their differences in perspective,
institutional theory, and stakeholder theory overlap sig-
nificantly and share a common interest: explaining how
organizations ensure survival and growth (Chen and
Roberts 2010). External pressures explored in institutional
theory and questions of power, legitimacy, and other
sources of influence (Markowitz et al. 2008) are also
incorporated into the study of stakeholder relationships. In
contrast to institutional theory, stakeholder theory with its
focus on the firm emerged in opposition to the shareholder
view of the firm, according to which the only relevant
stakeholder of the firm is the shareholder. Stakeholder
theory argues that the tension or alignment between the
interests of managers and shareholders is not the only
relationship that is relevant to a corporation (Freeman
1984; Donaldson and Preston 1995). From there, stake-
holder theory developed and established itself throughout
the 1990s with contributions from Goodpaster (1991),
Clarkson (1994, 1995), Donaldson and Preston (1995),
Rowley (1997), and Frooman (1999) being among the most
prominent ones. Because of its firm-level unit of analysis, it
has been used in studies in the field of responsible
investment to examine stakeholder relationships between
actors, for instance NGOs and the investment community
(Guay et al. 2004).
Kaler (2006) names one of the functions of stakeholder
theory in the field of business ethics as being a tool for
understanding CSR. One of the characteristics that make it
suitable for that application is that it is managerial
(Donaldson and Preston 1995) in the sense that it is useful
in directing managers toward the serving of particular
interests. For as long as the interests served by organiza-
tions, the financial interests of shareholders and owners
were primarily explaining that status quo did not present a
challenge. However, in an increasingly mobilized society
(Power 1997; Strathern 2000) where NGOs, employees,
suppliers, and governments are more active in presenting
their claims of organizations, how do managers decide
which of those claims are worthwhile in terms of dedi-
cating limited resources of time, labor, and capital to them?
While in the past investors were seen as a stakeholder, this
paper argues that investors themselves are increasingly the
object of other stakeholder claims. How do they choose
between these competing demands? Here the notion of
stakeholder salience theory becomes useful. And it is a
variation of that same question that this paper addresses:
why do institutional investors choose to satisfy the claim of
signing the PRI among many other stakeholder claims
addressed at them?
In this paper, we choose to apply Mitchell et al.’s (1997)
stakeholder salience model, following Gifford (2010), as
one of the most influential frameworks in the literature
(Mainardes et al. 2012). There are important advantages to
Mitchell et al.’s model that explain its widespread adop-
tion. It is political, acknowledging the organization’s
position at the intersection of conflicting and unequal
interests. It is practical and easily operationalized, offering
versatile and relevant categories applicable to varied
stakeholder relationships (Tashman and Raelin 2013). It is
also dynamic, recognizing that stakeholder relationships
are transient and although not exploring that aspect of the
relationships extensively, it leaves space for its inclusion
(Friedman and Miles 2002; Myllykangas et al. 2010;
Mainardes et al. 2012).
Mitchell et al.’s model has been applied extensively to
examine an organization’s relationship with different
stakeholders (Harvey and Schaefer 2001; Parent and
Deephouse 2007; Mainardes et al. 2012; Brower and
Mahajan 2013; Chang et al. 2014), but it has rarely been
applied empirically to focus in detail on a particular
stakeholder relationship, which this paper undertakes.
This framework has also been further developed by
Gifford (2010) specifically in the context of responsible
investment, making the extended version a highly adequate
Table 1 The six principles for
responsible investment
(1) We will incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes
(2) We will be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into our ownership policies and practices
(3) We will seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which we invest
(4) We will promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the investment industry
(5) We will work together to enhance our effectiveness in implementing the Principles
(6) We will each report on our activities and progress toward implementing the Principles
Sources of Stakeholder Salience in the Responsible Investment Movement: Why Do Investors…
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tool for addressing the particular stakeholder relationship
in question. Mitchell’s et al. stakeholder salience model
and Gifford’s additions to it are described in more detail in
the next section of the paper.
Theoretical Framework
Mitchell et al.’s stakeholder salience model is a tool both
for the identification and the prioritization of stakeholders
and their claims (Neville et al. 2011). In this paper, the
underlying assumption is that the PRI is a stakeholder from
the perspective of investors, with its mission of ‘under-
standing the implications of sustainability for investors and
supporting signatories to incorporate these issues into their
investment decision making and ownership practices’ (PRI
website 2014). The PRI’s stakeholder claim that manage-
ment prioritizes over others or not is that an investment
institution should sign the principles.
As stated in the introduction, it is more common for the
investor to be considered as a stakeholder from the per-
spective of the firm (Kaler 2003). While this is the natural
approach in questions relating to corporate strategy, when
discussing investment, stakeholder relationships from the
investor’s perspective become relevant. From the inves-
tor’s perspective, it is the PRI that is a stakeholder (Free-
man 1984). Either its claim is salient to investors and they
become a signatory or it is not and they do not sign, fol-
lowing Eesley and Lenox’s (2006) action-based definition
of salience. Taking this approach contributes to the work
within stakeholder theory that has been undertaken to
expand our views of stakeholders and stakeholder rela-
tionships (Crane and Ruebottom 2011; Rowley 1997). It
also follows the lead of scholars who have applied stake-
holder theory to different types of institutions, for instance
Knox and Gruar (2007) who take the perspective of a non-
profit organization and examine stakeholder relationships
from its perspective. A more recent example is a paper by
Sobczak and Harvard (2015) discussing the influence of
NGOs, government, members, and other stakeholders on
labor unions. The theoretical framework is applied to
identify to what degree the PRI’s stakeholder claim pos-
sesses the salience-producing attributes as predicted by
Mitchell et al. These attributes are power, legitimacy and
urgency.
Mitchell and his co-authors adopt Etzioni’s (1964)
typology of power. Power concerns the coercive, utilitar-
ian, or normative means that a stakeholder has at their
disposal to exert influence on management. Coercive
power relates to the use of force, restraint, or violence to
achieve the actor’s desired outcome despite resistance
(Weber 1947). Utilitarian power is based on material
resources e.g., shareholders exercise utilitarian power by
means of financial reward or punishment i.e., investment or
divestment. Using normative power is linked to symbolic
resources, such as media attention or reputation.
Legitimacy and urgency apply to how the claim itself is
viewed by the management. Legitimacy is ‘a generalized
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and defini-
tions’ (Mitchell et al. 1997). Mitchell et al. divide it into
individual, organizational, and societal legitimacy where
the degree of legitimacy is tied to the perception of an
individual, the whole organization, or society’s expressed
endorsement of the claim as legitimate.
Gifford (2010) introduces another moderating factor,
which is pragmatic legitimacy. It refers to the business case
perspective on the stakeholder’s claim. It is determined by
the strength of the arguments presented by the stakeholder,
and the amount of new information they present to the
management.
The final factor presented by Mitchell et al. is urgency.
It refers to the degree to which the claim is perceived by
management as calling for immediate attention. According
to Agle et al. (1999), urgency can be a crucial factor in
achieving maximum salience. Urgency has two sources:
time sensitivity and criticality, time sensitivity coming
from time pressure and criticality the importance attached
to the claim by the stakeholder. For example, in Gifford
(2010) stakeholders signal criticality by being persistent,
assertive and by dedicating significant resources to
advancing their claim.
Gifford (2010) expands Mitchell’s et al. model, based on
its application to a shareholder-company relationship in an
engagement context. Besides the additions already men-
tioned, he expands the framework with four moderating
factors of pragmatic legitimacy, management values, the
relative economic size of the stakeholder, and coalition
building. Gifford also adds a temporal dimension to the
relative importance of these factors, in that different
sources of salience are added to the equation during the
interaction with the stakeholder, rendering the model even
less static. This is also the way institutional theory has
evolved from its early static view of institutions to more
dynamic models that take into account the existence of
competing logics (Meyer and Hollerer 2014).
Pragmatic legitimacy is the perceived legitimacy of the
stakeholder claim as well as the value and relevance of the
new information that the claim brings to the attention of
managers that they would not otherwise have considered.
Management values are defined as the degree of overlap
between the values expressed through the stakeholder
claim and the values of managers. It can moderate salience
independently of the attributes proposed by Mitchell et al.
(1997).
A. A. A. Majoch et al.
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The size of the stakeholder relative to the company
contributes to salience through the increased power and
legitimacy that stem from it. For example, a larger share-
holder is likely to hold a more significant stake in a smaller
company and have more access to governance power as a
result. Likewise, they are likely to be a more legitimate and
important actor on the market.
The final moderating factor-coalition-building refers to
the pooling of resources by stakeholders. A stakeholder
coalition has the combined size, resources, legitimacy, etc.
of its participants (e.g., coalitions of shareholders, policy
makers, or NGOs). It is therefore a moderating factor of
power, legitimacy, and urgency.
Applied Framework
The application of stakeholder salience theory to the
research question ‘Why do investors sign the PRI?’ is
complicated by the fact that for the purpose of this
research, there is no single stakeholder whose claim’s
salience has specific attributes from the Mitchell and Gif-
ford frameworks. Therefore, the analysis focuses on the
salience of the claim rather than a particular stakeholder.
The claim to sign the PRI presented to the investor can and
is advanced by the PRI itself, but in many cases, it is also
advanced by other stakeholders e.g., the trustees, an NGO,
a senior manager, and it is in that context that it possesses
some of the attributes that contribute to its salience. Free-
man (1984) specified that perceived salience can result
from the attributes of both a claim and a stakeholder group,
as Eesley and Lenox (2006) confirm empirically in a study
of stakeholder action on environmental issues. In the case
discussed in this paper, therefore, the subject is the claim to
sign the PRI but its salience may be attached to different
stakeholders. Eesley and Lennox (2006) test the legitimacy
and urgency attributes as applied to stakeholder claims in a
data driven paper and obtain positive results. However,
academic literature has generally focused on the salience of
stakeholders rather than their claims. One of the contri-
butions of this paper is to further explore the perceived
salience of a stakeholder claim through empirical research.
Below we address each attribute from the Mitchell
et al.’s (1997) and Gifford’s (2010) framework, and explain
how it is applicable to the PRI-investor relationship. Each
of these attributes is a potential source of salience of the
claim to sign the PRI and in coding our dataset we look for
evidence that backs this intuition.
As a voluntary and aspirational framework the PRI itself
does not use the means of threat or coercion to influence an
investor’s decision to sign. Coercive power as a means of
increasing the salience of the claim to sign the PRI would
have to come from other sources such as regulatory bodies
or trustees. A utilitarian, financial incentive is most likely
to come from an investor’s clients. The desire to attract
new clients or to satisfy the demand from existing ones by
signing the PRI would be examples of utilitarian power as a
source of salience. The reputational benefits and the sig-
naling of an ESG capability involved in becoming a PRI
signatory are examples of normative power, as non-mate-
rial, symbolic incentives to sign the PRI.
Urgency, as the degree to which a stakeholder’s claim
calls for immediate attention (time sensitivity), has its source
in the increasing visibility of the PRI in the investment space
and the pressure on investors to join the growing trend of
responsible investment. The critical aspect can be found in
the persistence of stakeholders asking investors to sign the
PRI, and the amount of resources they dedicate to advancing
their claim. Legitimacy in an investor-PRI interaction can
stem from the legitimacy of the PRI as an organization (or-
ganizational legitimacy), of an individual (individual legit-
imacy) or from the perceived endorsement of the principles
by society (societal legitimacy).
Gifford adds to the above the relative economic size of
the stakeholder, which in this context becomes the size of
the PRI and the growing weight of the AUM of the existing
signatories; coalition building, i.e., stakeholders building
coalitions to advance the claim of signing the PRI more
effectively, for example, the PRI securing the endorsement
of the UN; management values which in the case of some
investors may already be aligned with those represented by
the Principles before signing; and pragmatic legitimacy in
the form of a perceived business case behind the stake-
holder claim, in this case the materiality of ESG issues in
investment.
The temporal dimension of the model highlighted by
Gifford is observed both in the importance of different
attributes in each year of the sample and in the importance
of different attributes over time to signatories who joined in
each of the sample years. But empirical evidence is needed
to deepen our understanding.
Data and Method
The data for this study is sourced from a confidential
dataset of annual questionnaires from 2007 to 2011 on the
implementation of the PRI principles. This paper presents
an analysis of responses from asset owners, asset managers,
and insurers. In the first few years of this period
(2007–2010), the questionnaire was obligatory.1 All
1 Signatories for whom the survey is obligatory have to respond to
the survey each year. This means that depending on the organization,
the same answers will be coded repeatedly over several years, or the
organization will modify them year by year.
Sources of Stakeholder Salience in the Responsible Investment Movement: Why Do Investors…
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responses from signatories who signed beginning in 2011
are voluntary.
The question coded for the purpose of this paper was
‘Why did your organization join the PRI?’ or ‘Please
describe the benefits you have enjoyed as a result of
signing the PRI.’ This question was optional and open
ended. Table below gives some information on the question
throughout the survey years and the makeup of the
respondents (Table 2).
The question only corresponds directly to the research
question in the years 2008 and 2009. The questions from
years 2009–2011 are only related, and they approach the
decision to sign the principles from a backward looking
perspective, evaluating the positive results of the decision.2
The number of responses to the relevant question
remains at around or slightly below 90 % of the total
responses to obligatory questions and at around 60 % of the
total signatory number throughout the sample years. The
geographical distribution of the sample is still overweight
in developed regions, with very similar numbers in the
general signatory body.
The proportion of asset managers versus asset owners
among the respondents gradually shifted over the years, in
the sample analyzed as well as the rest of the signatory
body. Among asset owners, 60 % of assets were managed
internally in 2011. Around half of asset owners are non-
corporate pension funds, followed by the second largest
group of corporate pension funds accounting for 25 % of
respondents in 2011. Among asset managers, mainstream
investment managers are responsible for 77 % of the
responses. They are followed by dedicated SRI Managers
-12 %, and themed fund managers -9 %.
Listed equity and fixed income are the two dominant
asset classes accounting for 36 and 49 % of respondents’
assets in 2011, respectively. The third largest category
(13 %) is cash, commodities, and other assets.
The analytic method used in this paper is content anal-
ysis. It is defined as a research technique used to system-
atically make inferences about the intentions, attitudes, and
values of individuals by identifying specified characteris-
tics in textual messages that are assumed to be objective for
the purpose of the study (Morris 1994). It allows for the
systematic, numeric analysis of a large amount of text in a
manner customized to the research that is being conducted.
Content analysis has featured regularly in management
literature (Bergh 1993; Butterfield et al. 1996; Buttner
2001; Davy et al. 1992; Molloy et al. 2011), accounting
(Beck et al. 2010; Fischer 2010), marketing (Hite et al.
1988; Burnett et al. 1991; Rust and Cooil 1994), and
business ethics where it has been often applied to analyze
large volumes of company produced publications relating
to their ESG policies and activities (Holder-Webb et al.
2009; Jose and Lee 2007; Lefebvre and Singh 1992; Sheth
and Babiak 2010; Stray 2008). It is also the dominant
research method for collecting empirical evidence in the
field of social environmental accounting (Parker 2005). See
Appendix 3 for a more detailed analysis of manual content
coding.
Two reasons we chose manual coding over automated
coding are specifically related to this PRI dataset. First, the
data was collected from organizations from over 30
countries. The differences in wording between even a
handful of countries can be hard to manage in computer-
ized coding, so we decided it would not be effective in a
study with such broad geographical scope to correctly
identify the entire variety of phrases for automated coding.
Second, responsible investment is an emergent field and
does not have an established vocabulary (Sandberg et al.
2009), which makes discrepancies even more likely to
obscure results when using automated coding. Based on
this, the authors agreed that to obtain the most accurate
results, we should use manual coding where the categories
answers fall into are decided on a case by case basis. As
observed by George and Louise Spindler (1997), ‘only the
human observer can be alert to divergences and subtleties
that may prove to be more important than the data pro-
duced by any predetermined categories of observation or
any instrument’ (p. 66–67). To ensure a high degree of
reliability of the coding, it has been reviewed and discussed
by James Gifford, founder and executive director of PRI
until 2013, and author of extended theoretical framework
used in this paper, as well as PRI staff members.
We use magnitude coding for each observation, following
Wolfe et al. (1993) finding that counting each occurrence of
an item in content analysis equally is a simplification and
may produce misleading results. Units of text are coded on a
scale: 0-no support, 1-weak support, 2-moderate support,
3-strong support, and 4-very strong support. However, only
units coded 2–4 contribute toward the results presented in the
analysis section of this paper to exclude instances where the
coding might depend more on the coder’s interpretation of
the text than its explicit message. The coding method applied
is also simultaneous, meaning that each unit of analysis can
be coded as supporting multiple attributes in the theoretical
framework (Saldana 2009). Following Gray et al.’s (1995)
recommendation, the unit of analysis used is predominantly
sentences; however, in cases where responses are poorly
structured or unnecessarily long, multiple sentences or
responses as a whole are an alternative. Morris (1994) also
observed that coding based on entire units of text results in
higher agreement between coders and human and computer
analyses, which provides justification to depart from sen-
tences as units of analysis if they are not singularly signifi-
cant enough.2 Assets were managed internally.
A. A. A. Majoch et al.
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Data Analysis and Discussion
We use descriptive statistics to demonstrate the importance
of each factor and how it changed over time. We consider
the absolute number of answers in support of an attribute in
a given year and the number as a proportion of all the
responses to the relevant question. We look at aggregate
results from all signatories, as well as split into asset
owners and investment managers, and by groups of sig-
natories who signed in each sample year. The percentages
in Tables 3, 4, and 5 below do not add up to 100 because
they are a proportion of all survey answers submitted in the
given year, and the percentage not mentioned would not
have been coded in support of any of the attributes.
Power
In considering the claim of signing the PRI, power as a
source of salience is closely linked to the institutional
investors’ relationships with their other stakeholders, such
as clients, regulators, and society. Coercive power means
that a stakeholder has the power to force an investor to sign
the PRI, as for instance a legislator would. Normative
power works through symbolic means such as the reputa-
tional consequences of rejecting or satisfying a stakeholder
claim. Utilitarian power is exerted via material incentive,
for example, the awarding and withdrawing of pension
fund mandates.
Coercive power as a source of salience of the claim to
sign the PRI is not documented in the data. This was in line
with the researchers’ expectations based on the voluntary
and aspirational nature of the PRI framework (Richardson
2009; Scherer and Palazzo 2011) and the lack of formal
mechanisms of power active in the PRI-investor relation-
ship such as legislation.
The strongest evidence emerged for normative power.
217 respondents in 2011 submitted answers that the
researchers coded as support for the attribute of normative
power being a source of salience in the decision to sign the
PRI. This number grew from 3 % in the first year of the
sample, to 6 % in 2008, 16 % in 2009, and 18 % in 2010
before reaching 47 %, almost half of the sample, in 2011.
Normative power started out more prominently in the asset
owner sample and continued to grow steadily, whereas in
the investment manager sample it started out weaker but
caught up with the asset owners by 2010. This translates to
asset owners such as pension funds and insurers experi-
encing the reputational and other symbolic pressures and
benefits earlier in the sample period, before they became a
source of salience in the eyes of investment managers,
possibly with the former driving the latter.
Mainstream investment managers and corporate pension
funds were more influenced by normative power than their
SRI and public counterparts. In 2011, 40 % of corporate
pension funds and 21 % of mainstream investment man-
agers mentioned normative power in their responses,
Table 2 This table displays the wording of and number of responses to the survey question analyzed versus mandatory questions and the
proportion of asset owners and asset managers in the respondent group
Number of
responses to the
question
analyzed
Number of
responses to the
obligatory
questions
Respondents to question
analyzed as a proportion
of all signatories (%)1
Wording of the question
by survey year
% of asset managers
among all
respondents in
survey year
% of asset owners
among all
respondents in
survey year
2007 97 105 63 Why did your
organization join the
PRI?
43 57
2008 154 174 59 Why did your
organization join the
PRI?
46 54
2009 245 286 59 Please describe the
benefits you have
enjoyed as a result of
signing the PRI
55 45
2010 375 433 60 Please describe the
benefits you have
enjoyed as a result of
signing the PRI
62 38
2011 464 540 57 Please describe the
benefits you have
enjoyed as a result of
signing the PRI
63 37
1 as of the month the survey was due in the given year
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compared to 18 % of public pension funds, and 11 % of
SRI managers. This would suggest that the impact of the
PRI stamp on mainstream investment manager, corporate
pensions image, and reputation is larger, perhaps because
they start out with no responsible investment image while
public pensions and SRI investors are more likely to have
communicated an investment approach similar to the PRI
principles even prior to signing.
The proportion of responses referring to utilitarian
power display a similar growth, although slightly smaller,
starting at 1 % in 2007 and slowly growing to 9 % in 2009,
then eventually reaching 32 % in 2011. Utilitarian power
found more support among asset manager signatories,
likely due to the power relationship between asset owners
and investment managers where an ESG capacity is
becoming a consideration in hiring managers. A main-
stream Australian investment manager says ‘We have been
queried and reviewed by asset consultants and clients on
our ESG activities’ (PRI Association 2013). A mainstream
UK fund explains: ‘Becoming a PRI signatory has also
enabled us to respond positively to asset owner’s RFIs and
RFPs (requests for information and requests for proposal
respectively) that increasingly ask about status regarding
the PRI’ (PRI Association 2013). Therefore, investment
managers signing the PRI are responding to the material
incentive of gaining new clients or satisfying the clients
they already work for.
Asset owners quote the support and interest of their
members as incentives, e.g., ‘Supports the interests/needs
of our membership’ as stated by a Canadian public pension
fund (PRI Association 2013). These answers offer evi-
dence that asset owners are becoming more confident about
the place of ESG considerations in investment practice
within a traditional fiduciary framework.
For added perspective, it is useful to look at the dis-
tinction between the proportion of mainstream versus SRI
investment manager responses and public versus private
pension fund responses coded in support of utilitarian
power: 15 % of all mainstream investment manager
responses to the questions were coded in support of utili-
tarian power in 2011, compared to 11 % of SRI managers.
The proportion of mainstream investment manager
responses remained higher throughout the sample, sug-
gesting that this group is more financially driven than SRI
managers.
A parallel pattern is clear among asset owners in 2011
where 20 % of corporate fund responses were coded in
support of utilitarian power, compared to 12 % of public
funds, again likely because of the more financially driven
character of corporate pensions compared to public
pensions.
It is also interesting to see that the growth of support for
the power attributes are not as sharp among signatoriesT
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who signed the PRI in the first 2 years as it is among the
later years. This indicates that these two groups are most
driven by different attributes: the earlier signatories are less
likely to have signed for reputational gains, or to attract
new business, than their later counterparts who were per-
haps looking for those benefits as the PRI accelerated the
growth of ESG in the industry. This divide between the
early and the later signatories is reinforced by the differ-
ence in their support for management values and pragmatic
legitimacy and is consistent with Gifford’s (2010) temporal
aspect where different attributes have varying importance
to the stakeholder relationship in time.
The dominant role of normative and utilitarian power as
a factor contributing to ESG related behavior by organi-
zations does not come as a surprise considering the degree
to which it has been present in previous literature on the
topic of CSR and SRI adoption. In terms of utilitarian
power, Mackey et al. (2007) propose a model where ethical
activity is beneficial to the organization conditional on a
favorable supply and demand balance. This angle of
analysis is seconded by Barnett (2007) and corresponds to
investors signing the PRI to meet client demand, more
pronounced among asset managers, as their asset manager
clients are more likely to clearly communicate ESG
requirements.
This source of salience is also theorized in the form of
relational organizational identity orientation in Brickson
(2007). Brickson distinguishes between collectivistic,
relational, and individualistic organizations, each of which
responds primarily to values-based, client-related, and
material incentives, respectively. Investors signing the PRI
in response to client expectations or in an effort to attract
clients would be placed somewhere between relational and
individualistic orientation, depending on how much it is
utilitarian and normative power related to client relation-
ship and reputation and how much purely business case-
type pragmatic legitimacy that drives their behavior
(Brickson 2007).
Normative power being an important attribute raises
questions regarding a possible decoupling of policy and
practice among PRI signatories (Crilly et al. 2012; Weaver
et al. 1999). In this context, it would mean investors
signing the PRI to satisfy stakeholders and for reputational
or signaling benefits while limited effort is made within the
organization to integrate the principles into investment
practice, a legitimacy-seeking strategy described in detail
by Long and Driscoll (2008). Based on our data, we cannot
conclude if that is the case but it is a possibility that could
be explored by further research.
Urgency
We find no support in the data for urgency as a source of
salience. Signatories make no explicit reference to the
timing aspect of the claim to sign the PRI, or pressure
resulting from the intensity of resources used by stake-
holders in advancing it. This may be explained in part by
urgency being part of the investor-client relationship where
an organization considers joining the PRI for a long time
and a conversation with a client who communicates that
they are transitioning toward all-PRI-signatory managers
delivers the final push (Gifford 2013, pers. comm.). It is
likely that such instances would be reported as utilitarian
incentive without mention of the urgency component.
Other studies in the area of stakeholder salience have
reached conflicting conclusions on urgency being a con-
tributing factor (Hautbois et al. 2012; Parent and Deep-
house 2007; Neville et al. 2011; Weber and Marley 2012),
and in this paper, we cannot establish its relevance based
on the data despite considerable anecdotal evidence in its
favor (Gifford 2013, pers. comm.).
Legitimacy
Of the legitimacy attributes, individual legitimacy is not
documented in the data, as signatories do not make refer-
ence to individuals having a role in advancing the claim to
sign the PRI. Individual legitimacy was also among the less
salient attributes in Gifford’s (2010) study of stakeholder
engagement, but it has otherwise not been explored
empirically in stakeholder theory literature. There is some
discussion in the literature based on mainly qualitative
Table 4 Shows the difference between asset owner (AO) and investment manager (IM) answers for some key attributes
Mitchel et al. MV IM MV AO PL IM PL AO PU IM PU AO PN IM PN AO Gifford MV IM MV AO PL IM PL AO
2007 0.90 0.60 0.29 0.31 0.048 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.90 0.60 0.29 0.31
2008 0.71 0.58 0.25 0.25 0.086 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.71 0.58 0.25 0.25
2009 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.21 0.11 0.03 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.07 0.19 0.21
2010 0.11 0.06 0.44 0.31 0.16 0.05 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.44 0.31
2011 0.07 0.05 0.44 0.27 0.14 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.07 0.05 0.44 0.27
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evidence that individuals can play a catalyzing role in
institutional transition in an ESG context (Lewis and Jur-
avle 2009; Waddock 2011).
The presence of organizational legitimacy in the survey
responses has grown steadily over the sample period.
Signatories refer to the legitimacy of the PRI as an orga-
nization adding to the salience of the claim to sign, and also
to the PRI conferring legitimacy on their own organization
and their SRI efforts of joining a leading initiative in the
responsible investment space (Long and Driscoll 2008;
Perez-Batres et al. 2012).
For instance, a mainstream European fund says signing
the PRI ‘grants credibility to its commitment to sustain-
ability and corporate governance principles’ (PRI Associ-
ation 2011). A Canadian public pension fund quotes to be
‘benefiting from the credibility of the PRI in the investment
community as well as with companies we engage with’
(PRI Association 2011).
Table 5 Contains the itemized total number of responses supporting the most relevant attributes by signature year of respondent
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2006 (%) 2007 (%) 2008 (%) 2009 (%) 2010 (%)
Utilitarian power
2007 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
2008 6 3 1 4 2 1 0 0
2009 4 11 6 1 2 4 2 0 0
2010 6 13 15 17 1 2 3 4 5 0
2011 7 9 14 21 17 2 2 3 5 4
Normative power
2007 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
2008 6 4 0 4 3 0 0 0
2009 10 19 7 1 4 8 3 0 0
2010 12 20 25 12 0 3 5 7 3 0
2011 18 17 20 31 12 4 4 4 7 3
Management values
2007 43 30 44 31 0 0 0
2008 69 41 10 45 27 6 0 0
2009 15 11 0 0 6 4 0 0 0
2010 17 18 10 0 0 5 5 3 0 0
2011 15 18 18 1 0 3 4 4 0 0
Pragmatic legitimacy
2007 20 10 21 10 0 0 0
2008 26 17 3 17 11 2 0 0
2009 33 35 0 0 13 14 0 0 0
2010 52 51 60 35 0 14 14 16 9 0
2011 54 48 65 54 22 12 10 14 12 5
Societal legitimacy
2007 2 2 2 2 0 0 0
2008 5 1 0 3 1 0 0 0
2009 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
2010 2 1 3 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
2011 3 1 2 3 1 1 0 0 1 0
Organizational legitimacy
2007 2 0 2 0 0 0 0
2008 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
2009 12 17 0 0 5 7 0 0 0
2010 24 23 19 4 0 6 6 5 1 0
2011 23 20 18 5 4 5 4 4 1 1
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Societal legitimacy defined as the perception of social
support for a claim has had a small but constant presence in
signatory responses. Investors see signing the PRI as a step
toward aligning their goals with the goals of society, or
being better attuned to society. It is difficult to hypothesize
about why societal legitimacy was not an important factor
to investors—other than investors feeling little pressure
from the side of society as most ESG social pressure is
focused on corporates. As observed by Baron (2009) who
discusses societal pressures on organizations to engage is
CSR, society is not explicit in manifesting its preferences
and may therefore be difficult to quote as a source of sal-
ience. Support for societal legitimacy was slightly more
pronounced among public pension funds and SRI managers
than mainstream investment managers and corporate pen-
sions—at an around 5 % and 1 % mean, respectively—
again consistent with the generally more socially oriented
character of the former (Blackburn 2006; Sethi 2005;
Sievanen et al. 2013).
Extended Theoretical Framework
Of the Gifford additions to the stakeholder salience model
are relative economic size and coalition building, but these
attributes were not supported significantly by the data in
this study population. Relative economic size in the form
that Gifford introduces it to the model is reminiscent of
institutional isomorphism in institutional theory (DiMaggio
and Powell 1983), where the PRI as a growing trend in the
industry would encourage larger and larger numbers of
investors to sign. This may well be the case although it is
not recognized by investors as a contributing factor to their
decision to sign, or not reported as such. The relative size
of assets is only reported as a significant factor in the
context of coalition building opportunities for signatories
among themselves via the clearinghouse. That is also the
context in which coalition building is mentioned over-
whelmingly by signatories, and also in literature, for
instance as collectivistic organizational identity orientation
in Brickson (2007) or membership of industry associations
as a moderating factor of social responsibility of organi-
zations in Campbell (2007). Neither coalition building nor
relative economic size as defined in Gifford’s extended
model play a role in adding salience to the claim of signing
the PRI itself.
Pragmatic Legitimacy
Pragmatic legitimacy in the sense of a business case or
supplying management with new and relevant information
is found in a growing number of responses over the sample
period. At the end of the sample period, almost 50 % of
investment manager signatories referred to the PRI as
supplying relevant ESG integration methods and informa-
tion, up to 20 percentage points from 2007. The proportion
of asset owners grew in absolute numbers over the years
but remained at around 30 % of responses proportionately.
This is consistent with the fact that investment managers
should be more responsive to the business case argument
given that they are the most performance oriented and are
in charge of investing the assets, whereas asset owners
manage a minority of their assets internally.
Signatories see the value of the PRI in access to know-
how, best practice, research, and trends in the responsible
investment. They see the PRI as a learning tool for their
organizations in the transition toward an ESG integrated
investor, via webinars, discussions with other investors,
implementation support, collaborative engagements, and
the association’s research outputs. For instance, a French
asset manager says: ‘The PRI provides an ambitious
roadmap for continuous improvement with clear signposts
and long term objectives. Our organization has managed,
through its involvement in the past year, to move towards
greater ESG integration more broadly (additional asset
classes) and more deeply (from SRI to mainstream)’ (PRI
Association 2011). A Brazilian investment manager
describes the PRI as follows: ‘We have found a framework
that accommodated our pre-signing beliefs related to ESG
issues and value creation, and helped us organize or re-
shape our internal analysis processes around the principles’
(PRI Association 2011).
This finding is in line with much of the responsible
investment literature that acknowledges the increasing
realization among investors that SRI is a value-creating
approach (Louche 2009) and that investors follow-up their
investment beliefs with actions (Woods and Urwin 2010).
It is also in line with Arjalies’ (2010) social movement
perspective on the development of SRI, where institutions
seek to incorporate a new emerging logic into their existing
institutional logic to create a new mainstream hybrid. The
structure and know-how provided to its signatories by the
PRI helps investors with this process, therefore pragmatic
legitimacy contributes to the salience of PRI’s claim.
Management Values
The salience of management values were strongly sup-
ported in the first 2 years of the PRI surveys, but support
dropped dramatically in the subsequent years. In the years
2007, a staggering 90 % of asset owners and 60 % of asset
managers explain their decision to sign the PRI by stating
that the values of the PRI reflect the values of their orga-
nization, therefore, it is a natural step. In 2008, the asset
owner number drops to 70 % while the asset manager
number stays the same, but by 2009 evidence in both
investors groups is only found in 10 % of responses. This
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number does not grow in the rest of the sample period. The
groups of signatories that signed after year 2008 do not
report on management values at all. It is the first signatories
from 2006 to 2007 that drive the support for this attribute.
A possible explanation of the great prominence of
management values in the first years of PRI’s existence and
why it was followed by its relative unimportance in the
subsequent years is that the first wave of signatories would
have been those investors who were already ESG minded.
They made up most of the signatory body in the years
2007–2008, but by 2009 other factors such as the legiti-
macy of the PRI, utilitarian incentives, or pragmatic
legitimacy attracted large numbers of mainstream investors
who placed less emphasis on the alignment of values in
their thinking about the benefits of signing the PRI. This is
consistent with the social movement perspective on the
evolution of responsible investment from activist and
socially driven to profit driven (Markowitz et al. 2008).
Other studies provide contrasting evidence, such as Jansson
and Biel (2011) who find that institutional investors are not
values driven as opposed to individual investors
(McLachlan and Gardner 2004). It is, however, challenging
to relate management values in the sense that they are
manifested in the PRI-investor relationship to how they are
understood elsewhere in the literature. The PRI principles
convey little or arguably no moral values per se (Eccles
2010), while values-driven organizations as defined by
Baron (2009) or Brickson (2007) take into account higher
order values that are morally determined Figs. 2 and 3.
In summary, the attributes from the Mitchell et al.
framework most supported by the data are normative and
utilitarian power, and organizational and to a lesser extent
societal legitimacy. Of Gifford’s additions to the frame-
work, the attributes of management values and pragmatic
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legitimacy are the most prominent. The temporal aspect
observed by Gifford is manifested clearly throughout the
data in the variation over time in both the aggregate results
and in results for investors grouped by signature year.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that there is a set of attributes
that make the PRI as a stakeholder and its claim to sign the
six PRI salient to institutional investors. The dataset pro-
vides evidence of the stakeholder relationship between
investors and the PRI as defined by Freeman (1984) and
according to Mitchell et al.’s (1997) stakeholder identifi-
cation framework. The PRI has the legitimacy, power, and
management values attributes that contribute to stakeholder
salience. Based on an examination of 5 years of predomi-
nantly confidential survey data from PRI signatories
spanning the period from 2007 to 2011, we find that the
attributes that contribute most to the salience of the PRI,
and its claim are organizational and pragmatic legitimacy,
utilitarian and normative power, and management values.
There is a high degree of variability in time and across
groups of signatories who joined in different years, con-
sistent with the temporal effect observed by Gifford (2010),
and the dynamic view of stakeholder relationships (Fassin
2010; Sachs and Maurer 2009; Windsor 2010).
The strong presence of both utilitarian power and
pragmatic legitimacy attributes in the responses indicates
that an important source of salience for the claim to sign
the PRI is the growing recognition of the materiality of
ESG and its progressive mainstreaming reflected in
demand for SRI (Louche 2009; Gifford 2010). This adds to
the evidence already existing in the literature that investors
see SRI as an avenue to value creation (Crifo and Forget
2013).
Normative power and organizational legitimacy as
sources of salience highlight that signatories consider
signing the PRI to be a way of communicating a certain
image to clients and other stakeholders, and that the PRI
has succeeded in gaining a considerable level of organi-
zational legitimacy over its first 5 years that investors
recognize and want to benefit from by association (Mitchell
et al. 1997; Eesley and Lennox 2006). The prominence of
normative power reinforces other findings such as that
private equity funds adopt SRI strategies to differentiate
themselves from competitors (Crifo and Forget 2013).
The dominant presence of normative power provides
interesting input for the literature on decoupling, which
documents how organizations may decouple policy from
practice in an effort to respond to stakeholder pressures
(Crilly et al. 2012; Weaver et al. 1999). The dataset
available to us gives us limited opportunity to make
inferences about the practical implementation of the prin-
ciples and the closing of the gap between SRI policy and
practice (Haack et al. 2012), as we do not track individual
organizations over time. However, our analysis does
highlight this as an interesting question and hopefully
encourages further research in this area.
Management values are a unique attribute in that they
appear to have been of major importance as a source of
salience in the first 2 years in the sample, when the first
wave of ethically and ESG-oriented investors signed up to
the PRI. But they have been superseded by other factors in
the later years when the values motivated signatory
recruitment pool was largely exhausted and mainstream
investors were drawn to the PRI in large numbers by its
growing legitimacy and strong business case (Bromley and
Powell 2012; Haack et al. 2012). Our findings support the
proposition that the SRI movement transitions from
socially driven toward profit oriented (Markowitz et al.
2008). Further research is required to more precisely define
and measure the extent to which values play a role in the
shift of institutional investment towards ESG integration.
Societal legitimacy found weak evidence in the data.
Attributes of coercive power, individual legitimacy,
urgency, relative economic size of stakeholder, and coali-
tion building find little or no support in signatory survey
responses.
This paper contributes to a better understanding of the
stakeholder relationship between the PRI and investors.
From the analysis, we gain an insight into how the sources
of salience in this relationship are different from other
contexts, in which the stakeholder salience model has been
applied previously (Gifford 2010; Siltaoja and Lahdesmaki
2013; Hautbois et al. 2012; Parent and Deephouse 2007;
Weber and Marley 2012). For instance, Parent and Deep-
house (2007) find power to have the strongest influence on
salience, followed by urgency and legitimacy. In the case
of PRI signatories, legitimacy was more important than
power, and urgency appeared to play no role at all.
This paper also carries out a rare application of stake-
holder theory to institutional investors as the organization
managing its stakeholders, not as a stakeholder themselves,
therefore extending stakeholder theory. It also sheds more
light on the sources of salience of private regulatory ini-
tiatives in general, and of stakeholder claims as the primary
unit of analysis.
The findings have practical implications for both insti-
tutions operating in the responsible investment space and
investors themselves. A key take away for investors is that
the gap between the perception of responsible investment
as a legitimate investment strategy by clients and by
investors practicing it for sustainable value creation is
closing, as illustrated by the simultaneous rise in both
utilitarian and normative power. This should encourage and
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reassure existing and potential responsible investors of the
growing legitimacy of this investment approach. Institu-
tions with similar objectives and stakeholder relationships
to the PRI can better understand how the sources of
stakeholder salience shift over time and transition towards
a more business case, normative and legitimacy-driven
character.
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of this
research stemming both from the characteristics of the data
and the method.
The data is self-reported, which has a potential distort-
ing effect on the type of answers submitted. Moreover, the
answers analyzed in the sample were not mandatory,
meaning that the sample was likely to represent the more
involved among the PRI signatory base, who dedicated
resources above the minimum that is required to avoid
delisting. If that is the case, the results might be only a
biased reflection of the motivations of the entire signatory
body. It is however reassuring that the geographical dis-
tribution and investor type break down is not too dissimilar
between the signatories who answered the question annu-
ally and those who did not, which limits the risk of
response bias. However a clear limitation is that geo-
graphical variation is not studied in this research, although
it is acknowledged in the literature that responsible
investment differs geographically (Sakuma and Louche
2008; Sievanen et al. 2013; Sparkes 2002). Detailed
descriptive statistics comparing the two groups year on
year can be found in Appendix 2.
The discretionary coding method is also a research
limitation. It is hard to maintain consistency and lack of
bias throughout the coding process for a human coder. The
results are ultimately only one possible outcome of the
analysis based on the interpretation of textual data by only
one group of researchers.
The above research limitations are routinely found in
survey based research (Agle et al. 1999; Valentine and
Fleischman 2008). They are an obstacle to this type of study
being precise and exactly representative of reality. There-
fore the numbers quoted in the paper should be treated as a
rough estimate of general trends among a sample of PRI
signatories as reported by themselves, and as analyzed by a
small team of researchers and not necessarily an accurate
quantitative illustration of investor motivations.
This study opens up several avenues for further research.
The temporal dimension of stakeholder relationships which
is supported by our findings raises many questions around
the possible determinants and regularities that may be
found in this dynamic. There is also ample opportunity for
further research insight into the importance of particular
attributes in the salience of private regulatory processes to
particular stakeholders. We touch upon this topic by dis-
tinguishing between SRI and mainstream investors and
public and private pension funds but there remains much
more complexity to explore.
Furthermore, the phenomena of conferring legitimacy
(Long and Driscoll 2008; Perez-Batres et al. 2012) and
decoupling of policy and practice (Boxenbaum and Jonsson
2008; Bromley and Powell 2012) that we highlighted in
association with normative power may provide motivation
for further studies in this area, as the concern regarding the
true effectiveness of private regulatory processes in
changing institutional behavior is widely shared among
both practitioners and academics.
The attributes that find no support in our data also raise
further questions. One notable absence from the results is
individual legitimacy, despite there being qualitative evi-
dence that individuals do play a role in promoting ESG in
an institutional setting (Lewis and Juravle 2009; Waddock
2011). Urgency was also not mentioned by signatories,
continuing a trend of mixed results in the literature
(Hautbois et al. 2012; Parent and Deephouse 2007; Neville
et al. 2011; Weber and Marley 2012). The question of
whether or not these attributes contribute to the salience of
private regulatory processes invites further investigation
from future research.
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Appendix 1
Attribute Conditions that answers
coded as supporting
each attribute must
fulfill
Examples of text coded
as supporting each
attribute
Power
normative
Refers to benefit or
motivation related to the
perception of signing
the PRI, reputational,
branding or marketing
benefits, joining the PRI
as a license to operate.
Refers to the value of
signing the PRI as a way
of sending a signal to
clients and members
that the organization
takes its ESG capacity
seriously
‘The Principles provide a
public recognition of
our commitment to ESG
research’
‘The main benefits in our
opinion have to do with
the image of excellence
that the UN PRI
signature gives’
Power
utilitarian
Refers to fulfilling the
expectations of or
gaining approval of
existing or future
clients, answering the
rising demand on the
market for RI
‘We have been queried
and reviewed by asset
consultants and clients
on our ESG activities’
‘As a number of our
largest clients are also
PRI signatories and so
the greatest benefit has
been a clearer alignment
of manager/client
interests’
Power coercive Refers to legislation or
formal coercive means
by which stakeholders
force organization to
sign PRI
n/a Hypothetical answer:
‘It is required by the
stock exchange we are
listed on’
Urgency-time
sensitivity
Refers to the temporal
aspect of the benefit or
motivation to sign the
PRI, such as first-mover
status, impeding event
or deadline that is
relevant
n/a Hypothetical answer:
‘It helped us pre-empt
the questions on our
exploration of ESG
issues that we expected
at our upcoming AGM’
Urgency-
criticality
Refers to the intensity
with which stakeholders
demand that the
organization sign the
PRI
n/a Hypothetical answer:
‘Signing the PRI came
as a result of an
intensive engagement
with an NGO’
Legitimacy
organizational
Refers to the legitimacy of
the PRI as an
organization and/or
therefore its ability to
grant legitimacy to the
signatory. Refers to
signing the PRI as a
license to operate
‘We consider signing the
UN PRI principles as a
licence to operate’
‘Knowing we are
supporting and engaging
with a leading
organization committed
to the integration of
sustainability and
investment (…)’
Attribute Conditions that answers
coded as supporting each
attribute must fulfill
Examples of text coded
as supporting each
attribute
Legitimacy
individual
Refers to the legitimacy of
an individual that played
a role In the decision to
sign the PRI or has
contributed to the
benefits thereof
n/a hypothetical answer:
‘Ban Ki-Moon’s call for
investors to sign the PRI
convinced us to take the
step’
Legitimacy
societal
Refers to signing the PRI
as an effort to be closer
aligned with the interests
and/or goals of society,
or to better understand
them
‘ESG thinking helps our
organization
continuously in staying
attuned with society’
‘This will enable all funds
to enhance their
investment decision-
making for the benefit of
members, and society in
general, as the industry
realises its ability to
make an impact on some
major global issues’
Relative
economic
size
Refers to the size of the
PRI as a motivating
factor in signing the PRI
as a trend, a snowball
effect
n/a hypothetical answer:
‘The size of the AUM
represented by PRI
signatories convinced us
that we should sign also’
Coalition
building
Refers to the PRI creating
collaborations with other
stakeholders being a
factor in the investor’s
decision to sign
‘It also allows us to make
reference to the UN while
communicating on our
responsible investment
practices (…)’
Management
values
Refers to the values of the
organization being
aligned with the values of
the PRI
‘Alignment with others
who share the same
values’
‘The goals of the PRI are
very much aligned with
those of our organization’
Pragmatic
legitimacy
Refers to the PRI being a
useful framework for and
source of information on
and support in integrating
ESG into investment, and
the opportunities that
ESG creates
‘UNRPI reporting and
assessment tool provides
guidance on best practice
for reporting on our SRI
activities’
‘UNPRI newsfeed is
considered very useful by
the team’
‘A deeper understanding of
ESG issues and the link
to investment
performance’
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Appendix 2
Appendix 3
Use of manual content analysis
Some of the following studies in particular establish a
precedent for the choice of content analysis for coding self-
reported textual data. In 1990, Jarvenpaa and Ives used it to
analyze 649 letters to shareholders in annual reports to find
out about the importance of IT to corporate strategy (Jar-
venpaa and Ives 1990). Bravo et al. (2012) analyze self-
declared CSR activities of Spanish banking institutions.
Further, Meyer and Hollerer (2014) analyze the impact of
framing contested issues in public discourse on shareholder
value in Austria.
The motivation for using content analysis in this par-
ticular paper is explained most accurately by the
researchers’ objective of using the method most effective
in extracting maximum structured information from
unstructured textual data.
Among the most prominent advantages of manual cod-
ing for content analysis is that the human coders brings in
their experience and expertise into the coding process.
Each of the authors of this paper has had experience of
working in the PRI space and interacting with signatories,
which helps interpret data correctly. Humans generally
excel at analyzing unstructured text. It is for that reason
that Deffner (1985) argues that computerized coding lacks
validity by comparison, although it is effective as a method
to maximize reliability. Following an experiment compar-
ing automated and manual content analysis, Morris (1994)
concludes that both methods can be equally effective. The
fact that responsible investment still operates with an
emergent vocabulary (Sandberg et al. 2009) makes the
choice of manual content analysis a particularly suit-
able one since as it has been observed in previous academic
literature, computerized content analysis takes away the
complexity and context from language (Pennebaker and
Lay 2002; Bligh et al. 2004b) preventing higher level
insights into the material (Bligh et al. 2004a).
Moreover, as a methodology, content analysis is neither
an unambiguously qualitative or quantitative method
(Harwood and Garry 2003; Insch et al. 1997; Burnett et al.
1991). It can be described as qualitative in the first stage
where the text is analyzed and the content divided into
categories; quantitative when applied to quantifying the
occurrence and relative importance of the categories or
phenomena. This combination of qualitative and quantita-
tive characteristics in content analysis allows us to present
the data in a structured manner, and therefore communicate
the findings more clearly.
The limitations are as follows. Manual coding is not
very transparent, as opposed to automated coding follow-
ing simple phrase or keyword identification processes; nor
is it as consistent, because of fatigue, varying focus, and
attention during the process and possible personal bias
(Boritz et al. 2012; Morris 1994). A limitation that applies
to management and finance research is that there is so far
no specialized coding system (such as the Gottschalk-
Gleser (1969) method in psychology). This limits the cross-
comparability between different studies (Morris 1994).
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